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BANKRUPTCY'S CHALLENGE TO THE FLOATING
LIEN
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether compliance with the requirements of Article 9 ade-
quately safeguards the interests of a creditor secured by the
so-called "floating lien" will be tested in an attack based on
sections 601 and 642 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. The follow-
ing hypothetical will serve to illustrate both the premise and the
scope of our inquiry.
On April 1, E, a prospective creditor, files a financing state-
ment adequately describing R's inventory and containing a
claim to proceeds from the sale of such inventory. On April
15 a written security agreement containing an after acquired
property clause is executed and E advances the loan to R.
On October 1, X, an unsecured creditor of R, files a petition
to have R declared bankrupt. During the four months prior
to the filing of the bankruptcy petition R received several
shipments of new inventory that became part of the collat-
eral securing E's advance of April 15. At all times during
the four month period E knew R was insolvent.
Under the Code, E's security interest became perfected on
April 153 and automatically attached to each new shipment of
inventory4 and to the proceeds from sales. 5 The trustee in bank-
ruptcy is, therefore, powerless under sections 70 (c) 6 and 70(e)7
of the Bankruptcy Act because E's interest was at all times per-
fected. Two questions remain, however. First, can the trustee
recover the inventory received during the four month period by
proceeding under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, which pro-
vides that certain transfers are voidable as preferences even
though there has been strict compliance with applicable state
law governing perfection? Second, can the trustee prevent our
creditor from claiming under Code section 9-306(4) (d)8 the
1. Bankruptcy Act § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964).
2. Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
3. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10.9-303 (1966).
4. Id. § 10.9-204.
5. Id. § 10.9-306.
6. Bankruptcy Act § 70(c), 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1964). For complete discus-
sion see pp. 746-53 infra.
7. Id. § 70(e), 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1964). For complete discussion see pp.
753-58 infra.
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-306(4) (d) (1966).
773
1
et al.: Bankruptcy's Challenge to the Floating Lien
Published by Scholar Commons, 1967
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIhW
unidentifiable and commingled proceeds (a variant that will be
added later) received within ten days of bankruptcy on the
ground that this section creates an illegal state priority in con-
travention of the Bankruptcy Act which has pre-empted the area
of priorities in section 61?
II. SECTION 60 or THE BANKRUiPCY ACr
Simply stated, a preference is any transfer9 of property by an
insolvent debtor to satisfy or secure an antecedent debt. It should
be remembered, however, that not all preferences are invalid.
Before being stigmatized as a voidable preference the transfer
must fall within the language of section 60.10
The original anti-preference provision enacted in 189811 pro-
vided that a preference made within four months of bankruptcy
was voidable by the trustee in bankruptcy if the party receiving
the transfer had reasonable cause to believe that a preference
was intended. 12 It did not, however, contain a "perfection clause"
as we understand that phrase today and thus left the crucial
decision of determining the time of transfer to the courts during
a period when the judicial attitude toward secured commercial
transactions was more than hospitable. 13 This is perhaps best
illustrated by returning to our hypothetical under a slightly
changed factual pattern. Assume that E, instead of filing on
April 1, waited until September 15. Since E's security interest
was not perfected until filed, he is apparently now subject to all
the rigors of the bankruptcy trustee. When Sexton v. Kessler &
Oompany'4 presented our hypothetical for decision, however, a
unanimous Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes said:
9. Bankruptcy Act § 1 (30), 11 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) provides:
"Transfer" shall include the sale and every other and different mode,
direct or indirect, of disposing of or of parting with property or with an
interest therein or with the possession thereof or of fixing a lien upon
property or upon an interest therein . . .; the retention of a security title
to property delivered to a debtor shall be deemed a transfer suffered by
such debtor.
10. Bankruptcy Act § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964).
11. At common law an insolvent debtor had the right to prefer one creditor
over another. Grandison v. Robertson, 231 F. 785 (2d Cir. 1916).
12. This provision now appears as § 60(a) (1) and the first sentence of
§ 60(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964).
13. See 2 G. Giruroax, SECURITY INTERESTs IN PERsoNAL PROPERTY § 45.3.3,
at 1301 (1965). It should be noted that the various elements of a voidable trans-
fer are dependent upon the time of transfer for their existence.
14. 225 U.S. 90 (1912). In that case the debtor had promised to secure an
English creditor by pledge. The pledge was not delivered, however, until two
weeks before bankruptcy four years later. For a case in which the collateral
involved was inventory see Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U.S. 516 (1905).
[Vol. 19
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While the phrase "equitable lien" may not carry the reason-
ing further or do much more than express the opinion of the
court that the facts give a priority to the party said to have
it, we are of the opinion that the agreement created such a
lien at least; or, in other words, that there is no rule of local
or general law that takes from the transaction the effect it
was intended to produce. When the English firm took the
securities, [i.e., perfected its interest], it only exercised a
right that had been created long before bankruptcy, and in
good faith.15
The doctrine of "relation back" served to perfect the lien at the
time of agreement and thus no preference existed.
This manner of judicial favoritism toward a transaction ob-
viously antagonistic to the policy objectives of the Bankruptcy
Act supplied the incentive for a "crusade against equitable liens"
that gathered force during the 1920's and 1930's. 16 In 1938 Con-
gress responded to this movement by adding the following lan-
guage to section 60(a) :
A transfer shall be deemed to have been made at the time
when it became so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser
from the debtor and no creditor could thereafter have ac-
quired any rights in the property so transferred superior to
the rights of the transferee therein, and if such transfer is
not so perfected . . . it shall be deemed to have been made
immediately before bankruptcy.
1'7
Although the dissatisfaction with Sexton did not extend to every
lien sometimes referred to as "equitable,"' the apparent effect
of measuring the trustee's rights by a bona fide purchaser stand-
ard was to destroy many types of liens acquired in good faith
and for value because they were subordinate to the rights of
ordinary buyers. This became clear when the Court in Con
15. Sexton v. Kessler & Co., 225 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1912). Professor Gilmore
suggests we would be much better off today had Holmes used the word "im-
perfect" or "unperfected" instead of the phrase "equitable lien." 2 G. GIoP,
supra note 13, at 1301.
16. See 2 G. GILMoRE, supra note 13, at 1302.
17. Bankruptcy Act § 60(a), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964) (emphasis added).
18. 2 G. GiLmore, supra note 13, at 1302. The purpose of the 1938 amendment
was to invalidate the Sexton type secret lien. See McLaughlin, Defining a
Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HARv. L. RIv. 233, 251 (1946).
19671
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Emchange NationaZ Bank &Q Trust Company v. Klauder9 invali-
dated as a matter of law an assignment of accounts receivable
taken by the bank well before the four month period because it
failed to notify the account debtors, which, under the applicable
state law, was necessary in order to cut off the rights of subse-
quent assignees. This result was reached despite the fact that the
transfer was contemporaneously made with the advancement of
credit.2 0 Non-notification accounts receivable statutes21 were im-
mediately enacted in those states which could conceivably be
thought to be English rule states. 22 Under these statutes the
assignment creditors were given an indefeasible lien over subse-
quent assignees so that their interest was perfected when filed
for purposes of section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. While these
statutes provided an answer to Klauder in the area of accounts
receivable, the persistent vulnerability of transactions similar to
our hypothetical is readily apparent for the simple reason that
a buyer out of inventory in the ordinary course of business has
always taken and presumably will always take free of even a
perfected security interest.
No case arose under the 1938 amendment to challenge a secur-
ity interest in after acquired property23-a fact which in itself
may be of lasting significance-but the threat came clearly into
focus when a district court in the case of In re Harvey Distribut-
ing Company2 4 invalidated a lien duly executed and perfected
under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. The court struck down
"this healthy and 'above the Board' business"2 5 arrangement be-
19. 318 U.S. 434 (1943). Prior to this decision an assignment of accounts
receivable was generally invulnerable to attack. See Kennedy, The Trustee in
Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems Suggested
by Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 518, 544 (1960).
20. The trustee successfully contended that since the assignments were not
perfected against the subsequent "bona fide purchasers" when transferred they
must be deemed to have been made immediately before bankruptcy and thus for
an antecedent debt. See Countryman, The Secured Transactions Article of the
Commercial Code and Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 16 LAW & CONTEMP.
Pnon. 76, 80 (1951). Compare In re Vardaman Shoe Co., 52 F. Supp. 562 (E.D.
Mo. 1943) unth In re Rosen, 157 F.2d 997 (3d Cir. 1946).
21. E.g., S.C. CoM ANN. §§ 45-201 to -211 (1962).
22. Pennsylvania, whose state law was applicable in Klauder, followed the
English rule. For a complete discussion of the various pre-Code rules governing
perfection see Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-
Acquired Property Clauses Under the Code, 108 PA. L. REv. 194 (1959).
23. Hypothetical arguments supporting the position of both the trustee and
the secured party can be found in 2 G. Gr.Lmom, supra note 13, at 1311.
24. 88 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Va. 1950), reVd sub nom. Coin Machine Accept-
ance Corp. v. O'Donnell, 192 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1951). On appeal the 1950
amendment was held to apply retroactively.
25. Coin Machine Acceptance Corp. v. O'Donnell, 192 F.2d 773, 776 (4th
Cir. 1951).
[Vol. 19
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cause the trustee (under the trust receipts) was at liberty to sell
to buyers in the ordinary course of business free of the entruster's
security interest.26 Such "plain meaning" interpretation led
Congress to elevate the trustee in bankruptcy to the position of
a lien creditor in 1950 so as to clarify existing doubts among
lending institutions regarding the validity of security taken for
value and in good faith.27 The pertinent provisions of section
60 now provide:
(a) (1) A preference is a transfer, as defined in this title,
of any of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit of
a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or
suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four
months before the filing by or against him of the petition
initiating a proceeding under this title, the effect of which
transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater
percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same
class.
(2) For the purposes of subdivisions (a) and (b) of this
section, a transfer of property other than real property shall
be deemed to have been made or suffered at the time when
it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon such
property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a
simple contract could become superior to the rights of the
transferee.... [I]f any transfer of ... property is not so
perfected against such liens by legal or equitable proceed-
ings prior to the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding
under this title, it shall be deemed to have been made imme-
diately before the filing of the petition.
(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) of this subsection
shall apply whether or not there are or were creditors who
might have obtained such liens upon the property other than
real property transferred ....
(6) The recognition of equitable liens where available
means of perfecting legal liens have not been employed is
hereby declared to be contrary to the policy of this sec-
tion.. . .
26. In re Harvey Distrib. Co., 88 F. Supp. 466, 468 (E.D. Va. 1950).
27. The legislative history makes it clear that Congress also intended "to
retain unimpaired the basic object of the 1938 amendment which eliminated the
'relation back' doctrine of Sexton v. Kessler." H.R. REP. 1293, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1949).
1967]
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(7) [I]f the applicable law requires a transfer of prop-
erty other than real property for or on account of a new and
contemporaneous consideration to be perfected by record-
ing, delivery, or otherwise, in order that no lien described
in paragraph (2) of this subsection could become superior
to the rights of the transferee therein . . . the time of trans-
fer shall be determined by the following rules:
I. Where (A) the applicable law specifies a stated period
of time of not more than twenty-one days after the transfer
within which recording, delivery, or some other act is re-
quired, and compliance therewith is had within such stated
period of time; or where (B) the applicable law specifies
no such stated period of time . . . and compliance there-
with is had within twenty-one days after the transfer, the
transfer shall be deemed to be made or suffered at the time
of the transfer.
(b) Any such preference may be avoided by the trustee if
the creditor receiving it or to be benefited thereby or his
agent acting with reference thereto has, at the time when
the transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the
debtor is insolvent ....
(c) If a creditor has been preferred, and afterward in good
faith gives the debtor further credit without security of any
kind for property which becomes a part of the debtor's
estate, the amount of such new credit remaining unpaid at
the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy may be set off
against the amount which would otherwise be recoverable
from him .... 28
III. ARTicrm 9
The Bankruptcy Act defers to state law the steps required
for perfection.29 Therefore, when speaking about a security
interest it is necessary to look to the Code to determine when
perfection takes place.30 This will reveal the time of transfer by
which the various elements of a preference are tested and it thus
becomes possible to ascertain whether a voidable preference
exists.
28. Bankruptcy Act § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964) (emphasis added).
29. Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
30. Perfection takes place when the security interest has attached and the
applicable steps required for perfection (e.g., filing) have been completed. S.C.
Coan ANx. § 10.9-303 (1966). For complete discussion see pp. 704-19 infra.
[Vol. 19
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A. The Twenty-One Day Grace Period in Bankruptcy
It is important to keep in mind that perfection must be timely
if the transaction is to escape classification as a transfer for an
antecedent debt. With the exception of a purchase money secur-
ity interest which must be perfected within ten days,3 1 the Code
does not specifically provide an allowable period within which
to complete perfection. Since the Bankruptcy Act allows a
twenty-one day grace period for perfection where no stated
period is provided by state law,32 the question which naturally
arises is whether such a delay is permissible under the Code. In
other words, assume again that E did not file on April 1 as orig-
inally stated. Can he delay filing until twenty-one days after the
loan is made and remain invulnerable to the trustee's attack
under section 60?33 The bankruptcy provision is obviously in-
tended to recognize the impossibility of a purely contempo-
raneous transaction so the logical answer would seem to be in
favor of allowing the delay.34 However, the answer is not that
simple.
The Code drafters intended to favor the purchase money se-
cured party in a contest with his non-purchase money competitor
and, to accomplish this, gave him an additional ten days to per-
fect his interest. But when faced with the bankruptcy language
which limits the grace period to "a stated period of time" if less
than twenty-one days is specified by state law, the anomalous
result which follows, after accepting the full period for our
"ordinary" secured creditor, is that the favored party loses his
priority eleven days sooner than his competitor. This happen-
stance of legislation could be resolved by interpreting section
60(a) (7) of the Bankruptcy Act as adopting the shortest period
allowed by state law and by taking Article 9 as stating a period
of zero, or by allowing the twenty-one day period to extend to
both types of secured interest.85 It is obvious, however, that
neither of these solutions is consistent with the language of the
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-301(2) (1966).
32. Bankruptcy Act § 60(a) (7), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964). It should be noted
that the twenty-one day provision only applies when the transaction was in its
inception one for contemporaneous consideration.
33. The "or otherwise" phrase in § 60(a) (7) of the Bankruptcy Act seems
to contemplate the Code's concept of perfection occurring when the last event
required by § 10.9-303 takes place.
34. The experts generally agree that the twenty-one day period exists under
the Code. See, e.g., Kennedy, The Support of the Uniform Commercial Code
on Insolvency: Article 9, 67 Com. LJ. 113, 119 (1962). But see South Carolina
Nat'l Bank v. Guest, 232 S.C. 367, 102 S.E2d 215 (1958).
35. See 2 G. GuyoRn, supra note 13, § 45.8, at 1325.
1967]
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Bankruptcy Act. With no logical direction in which to turn, one
eminent authority suggests the courts might just as easily resolve
the question "by rolling the dice."36 Whatever the solution in
bankruptcy, it must be remembered that the practical reality of
the Code's "first to file" rule of priority37 does not favor even
a slight delay.
B. Validity of Section 9-108
The more realistic difficulty facing our creditor arises with
respect to the shipments of new inventory received during the
four months prior to bankruptcy without new and contempo-
raneous value passing to our debtor, R. This involves a conflict
between sections 9-108 of the Code38 and section 60(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act.39 The Code section provides:
When a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obliga-
tion, releases a perfected security interest, or otherwise gives
new value which is to be secured in whole or part by after-
acquired property his security interest in the after-acquired
property shall be deemed to be taken for new value and not
as security for an antecedent debt if the debtor acquires his
rights in such collateral either in the ordinary course of his
business or under a contract of purchase made pursuant to
the security agreement within a reasonable time after new
value is given.
40
The effect of this language is the creation of a legal fiction.
It determines that a debt which is in fact antecedent to a sub-
sequently perfected security interest shall not be considered as
antecedent-a presumption that is not only contrary to the facts,
but one which in light of the Code requirement that a debtor
have rights in the collateral before the security interest can
attach 41 cannot be reconciled with the plain implication of Corn,
Exchange National Bank &f Trust Company v. Kuder.42 This is
not to imply that all legal fictions are bad, because that is cer-
tainly not the case. Recognition of its existence does, however,
illustrate one aspect of the difficulty.
36. See id. at 1329.
37. S.C. CoDE Auu. § 10.9-301 (1966).
38. Id. § 10.9-108.
39. Bankruptcy Act § 60(a), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964).
40. S.C. CODE Aln. § 10.9-108 (1966) (emphasis added).
41. Id. § 10.9-204(1).
42. 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
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Commenting upon the potential effectiveness of the section,
the Code drafters state that the "rule is of importance princi-
pally in insolvency proceedings under the Federal Bankruptcy
Act or state statutes which make certain transfers for ante-
cedent debt voidable as preferences."-4 3 Apparently, this "prin-
cipal application" represents the section's only application. Its
single purpose has been described as an attempt to emasculate
section 60 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act by replacing judicial deter-
mination of the issue of antecedency with a simple fiat to the
effect that the debt is not antecedent to the transfer.
44
Apart from the policy considerations of whether the Bank-
ruptcy Act should accommodate section 10.9-108, the determina-
tion of what is or is not an antecedent debt is largely a matter
which falls within the doctrine of pre-emption.45 Neither the
Bankruptcy Act nor the Code attempt to define the term ante-
cedent debt. It has been suggested, however, that bankruptcy
section 60(a) (7) settles the issue by implication.4 6 The point
made is that the grace period provided in the Bankruptcy Act
is meaningless if it does not offer some insight into what con-
stitutes an antecedent debt.
Several respectable arguments have been advanced for sustain-
ing the lien on after acquired property. Possibly the best pro-
posal is that the new inventory is but a "substitution of col-
lateral" for that initially in stock when the security interest first
attached. Drawing an analogy between the substitution cases
47
in which a pledgor has been allowed by the pledgee to exchange
new security of equal value for that originally pledged and the
subsequent acquisitions of inventory, it is reasoned that the pol-
icy of section 60 rejects only those transfers which serve to
diminish the insolvent estate. Section 10.9-10848 attempts to fit
into this concept by limiting the after acquired lien to collateral
obtained "in the ordinary course of business or under a contract
of purchase made pursuant to the security agreement." Lending
43. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10.9-108, Comment 1 (1966).
44. Comment, 37 ST. JOEN's L. REv. 392, 400 (1963).
45. For complete discussion of the Bankruptcy Act's supremacy see pp. 744-
46 infra.
46. See Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 Ruions L. REv.
518, 547 n.125 (1960) ; Coogan & Bok, The Impact of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code on the Corporate Indenture, 69 YAiE L.J. 201, 244 (1959).
47. E.g., Stewart v. Platt, 101 U.S. 731 (1879); In re Pusey-Maines-Breish
Co., 122 F.2d 606 (3d Cir. 1941); In re Manning, 123 F. 181 (D.S.C. 1903).
For complete listing of cases see 3 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 862, § 6021 (14th
ed. 1966).
48. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-108 (1966).
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additional support to this theory is the argument under section
60(c) of the Bankruptcy Act that "when the . . [secured
party] permits proceeds from past security to be released to the
debtor, he is accomplishing the same result as the preferred
creditor who extends new credit."4 9
Another approach is based on the idea that the collateral is
but "a unit presently and continuously in existence-a 'floating
mass,' the component elements of which may be constantly
changing without affecting the identity of the res."5 Under
this "unitary concept" the inventory "mass" is treated as coming
into existence when the security interest first attaches. Subse-
quent acquisitions are given no identity but merely "flow" into
the mass already in existence and thus are said not to be acquired
by transfer.r1 It may be argued that the Code, by requiring the
debtor to have rights in the collateral before the security inter-
est can attach,52 rejects the theory, but the argument ignores the
main thrust of the concept-that the "mass" is the continuous
collateral.
Our discussion thus far has been completely hypothetical and
has provided little comfort to the holder of a security interest
in inventory. The first confrontation of Code section 9-108
and bankruptcy section 60(a), under other than hypothetical
circumstances, occurred in the case of In re Portland Newspaper
Pubishing 0.53 The facts of this case pertinent to the question
of whether a transfer of a prior security interest in accounts
receivable which came into existence during the 60(a) four
month period constituted a transfer for an antecedent debt are
as follows. In 1963, Rose City Development Company loaned
substantial sums of money to Portland Newspaper Publishing
Company. To secure these loans, Portland and Rose City entered
into a security agreement whereby Portland assigned to Rose
City a security interest in all its present and future accounts
receivable. A proper financing statement recordation under the
Code was completed in November of 1963. In September of
1964, Portland went into receivership and in October of 1964
was adjudicated a bankrupt. The preference controversy con-
49. See generally 2 G. GmLmoE, supra note 13, § 45.8, at 1325; Coogan &
Bok, mspra note 46, at 245.
50. Manchester Nat'l Bank v. Roche, 186 F.2d 827, 831 (1st Cir. 1951).
51. For a complete discussion of this theory see Henson, "Proceeds" Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 CoLum. L. Rxv. 232 (1965).
52. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-204(1) (1966).
53. 3 U.C.C. Rept. Serv. 194 (D.C. Ore. 1966).
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cerns those accounts receivable in which Rose City claims an in-
terest which did not come into existence under four months prior
to bankruptcy. Referee Snedecor, in discounting the merit of
the Code section, extensively reviewed the reasoning advanced
by various analysts of the "clash in underlying philosophies""
and expressed his own antipathy toward the present trend in
inventory and receivables financing. 5  The unitary and substi-
tuted collateral theories were discussed but neither was spe-
cifically accepted nor rejected. They were simply deemed
inapplicable to the circumstances attendant in the case. On
review by the District Court of Oregon, the Referee's intransi-
gent attitude regarding the Uniform Commercial Code's sanc-
tion of modern accounts receivable financing principles did not
prevail. The court held that the accounts receivable security
interest was not a preferential transfer under the Bankruptcy
Act. The district court recognized that revolving or flow
accounts receivable financing has been a long standing and
accepted method of responsible business practice. The court
stated:
The trustee and Referee both concede that Rose City would
have had a valid security interest if The Reporter [Port-
land] had deposited the collected accounts in a separate
bank account for the benefit of Rose City and then received
a new loan, daily if necessary, equal to the amount of the
deposit. The Code allows a financial institution or other
creditor to make a loan secured by present and future
accounts and permits the debtor to use the full amount of
the loan without routing the proceeds of the old accounts
through a cash collateral account. The old method was both
expensive and cumbersome and necessarily increased the
cost of money. I can find nothing either illegal or unethical
in the arrangement sanctioned by the Code.
Good business practice should be good business law.56
54. Id. at 198.
55. The old fashioned method of operating a business on the strength of equity
capital and unsecured bank credit based upon the financial integrity of the
debtor seems to be giving way to the modem trend of financing business
operations in reliance upon a floating lien on current assets with little
or no regard for equity capital .... These methods leave the daily
suppliers and employees in a perilous position.
Id. at 214. '
56. In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 371 F.Supp. 395, 400 (D. Ore.
1967).
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Thus, under this decision, concommitant with the provisions of
Code section 9-108, there is no preference when new accounts are
substituted for old ones pursuant to a properly filed security
agreement.
In Rosenberg v. Rudrkikl5  decided just a few months before
the district decision in Portland Newspaper, the District Court
of Massachusetts, under factual circumstances not dissimilar to
our hypothetical, faced the conflict more squarely than did
Referee Snedecor. After rather summarily declaring that the
test for determining the time of transfer under section 60(a) (2)
of the Bankruptcy Act does not require full perfection, the court
went on to uphold the validity of section 9-108 "in view of
the fact that the Uniform Commercial Code has now been
adopted by 48 states."'! In viewing the inventory as a "single
entity" or unitary mass Judge Ford made what possibly could
be the most relevant observation to date-"The transaction here
was not one of those which the provisions of section 60 were
designed to avoid. There was nothing here in the nature of a
secret lien."5' This characterization greatly influenced the Port-
land Newspaper court opinion which quoted several passages
from Rosenberg.
Neither Portland News nor Rosenberg are dispositive of the
question of conflict raised between sections 9-108 and 60(a);
however, they clearly indicate the split of authority which awaits
those provisions of the Code which, in any particular, invade
upon accepted bankruptcy concepts.
C. Commingled Proceeds
To raise the issue of the second question presented it will be
necessary to add a new variant to our hypothetical. Assume that
on September 28, three days before the petition is filed, R de-
posits in his general checking account all proceeds from sales
made within ten days of bankruptcy. During the bankruptcy
proceedings E asserts a claim to the deposited proceeds pursuant
to Code section 9-306(4) (d),o0 which in the event of insolvency
57. 262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967).
58. Id. at 639. With the exception of Louisiana all states have now passed
the Code.
59. Id. at 639 (emphasis added). Another district judge has expressed the
opinion that Code § 9-108 "is intended only as a purported definition of ante-
cedent debt to attempt to override the alleged harshness of section 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act." In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478, 482 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-306(4) (d) (1966).
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proceedings 61 gives a secured party with a perfected security
interest in proceeds a continued interest,
in all cash and bank accounts of the debtor, if other cash
proceeds have been commingled or deposited in a bank
account, but .. . limited to an amount not greater than the
amount of any cash proceeds received by the debtor within
ten days before the institution of the insolvency proceedings
and commingled or deposited in a bank account prior to the
insolvency proceedings .... 62
As previously noted, the conflict is based on the trustee's con-
tention that this section creates an illegal state "priority."'
If indeed a priority exists, the trustee will prevail. But if the
section is construed to create a lien, the opposite result follows.
Again no reported case has raised the issue as presented under
the Code. It is possible, however, to make more concrete observa-
tions concerning the Code section's validity by delving into its
ancestry. The forerunner of section 9-306(4) (d) was section
10(b) of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. That Act, which was
never enacted in South Carolina, sought to alleviate the secured
party's frustration in tracing proceeds by vesting in the entruster
the right,
to any proceeds or the value of any proceeds (whether
such proceeds are identifiable or not) of the goods, docu-
ments or instruments, if said proceeds were received by the
trustee within ten days prior to .. . the filing of a petition
in bankruptcy or judicial insolvency proceedings . .. and
to a priority to the amount of such proceeds or value.6 4
The first bankruptcy case to adjudicate a claim to unrelated
proceeds under this section of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act
was In re Harpeth Motors, Incorporated.65  In sustaining the
claim the court said:
61. The term "insolvency proceedings" is defined to mean "any assignment
for the benefit of creditors or other proceedings intended to liquidate or re-
habilitate the estate of the person involved." S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.1-201(22)
(1966).
62. A security interest in proceeds is continuously perfected if claimed in the
filed financing statement covering the original collateral. S.C. CoDE ANN.
§ 10.9-306(3) (a) (1966).
63. With one exception not here relevant (rent), section 64 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act prohibits all state created priorities. See Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11
U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
64. UziFom TRUsT REcEiPTs AcT § 10(b) (emphasis added).
65. 135 F. Supp. 863 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).
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[Tihe statute with respect to the value right or claim of the
entruster goes much further than to create a mere priority in
the distribution of the assets of the trustee in insolvency
proceedings, for it creates in the entruster's favor a claim...
having the same status as a lien claim and enforceable as
such independently of an insolvency or bankruptcy proceed-
ing.6
6
it should be noted that Judge Miller clearly contemplated sec-
tion 10(b) operating in a priority contest outside of bankruptcy.
This, of course, would not be the case under the Code.67 That
Harpeth was never appealed may also prove significant.
The Seventh Circuit had the question before it in the case of
In re Crosstown Motors, Iworporated6" but held that section
10(b) was an attempt to create a priority invalid under section
64 of the Bankruptcy Act. Reading literally the word "prior-
ity"09 the court reasoned that "[W]hen § 10 . .. is silhouetted
against its historical background the reason for the absence of
the word 'lien' and the use of the world 'priority' is pellucid."
70
The "pellucid" reference to the section's "historical background"
seems inconsistent because section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act was
not enacted until 1938,71 five years after the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act was approved by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws. The field of state-created
priorities had, therefore, not been pre-empted when the word
"priority" was inserted in section 10(b) of the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act and it can hardly be imagined that the drafters of
that section intended its effect to be dependent on such unpre-
dictable events.
Although section 9-306(4) (d) 72 is the lineal descendant of
section 10(b),78 it differs significantly in two respects. To avoid
the coldness of Crosstown's literal interpretation the phrase
"perfected security interest" has been substituted for the word
"priority." Perhaps of more importance, however, is the scope
of the Code section's coverage. Under the Uniform Trust Re-
66. Id. at 868.
67. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-306(4) (1966).
68. 272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959).
69. See UimouR TRUST RECIPrs AcT § 10(b).
70. 272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959).
71. Bankruptcy Act 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
72. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10.9-306(4) (d) (1966).
73. UNIFoRu TRUST RECEIPTs AcT 10(b).
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ceipts Act the entruster's claim extended to the "general assets"
of the insolvent. The Code provision cuts back on this claim
by limiting it to no more than "money in the bank." The prin-
cipal effect, therefore, is that the "policing" techniques developed
to comply with Benedict v. Ratner44 live on as a credit matter
in the application of this section. If for no other reason than
this, the section should be entitled to favorable treatment in
bankruptcy.
75
74. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
75. See generally Henson, supra note 51.
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